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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Douglas Earl Meyer appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces.  
Meyer contends the district court erred by concluding Meyer would not be entitled 
to a necessity defense instruction if his case proceeded to trial. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 Meyer was driving through Idaho on his way to California from Washington 
when an officer stopped him for speeding.  (R., pp.86, 93.)  During the traffic 
stop, Meyer reported that he had “1/4 pound of marijuana in the vehicle,” but 
indicated “he had a medical marijuana card.”  (R., p.93.)  Meyer told law 
enforcement he grew the marijuana himself and was taking it to his uncle 
because his uncle “wanted to try this different kind” that Meyer had.  (R., p.93.)  
Meyer was arrested and a search incident to arrest revealed a large amount of 
cash ($2,605.00) in Meyer’s pocket,1 which Meyer stated was from “settlement 
on a pension,” paraphernalia, and “six zip lock style clear plastic bags” of 
marijuana inside a cooler.  (R., pp.93, 97.)  “Each bag had a label in it with a 
name and weight.”  (R., p.93.)  The six bags were labeled as follows:  (1) “Bubba 
Kush – 30g – relaxing”; (2) “Jack Frost – 16g – Energetic”; (3) “Skywalker – 31g 
– Stress/Sleep”; (4) “White Russian – 15g – Sleep/Pain”; (5) “White Russian – 
30g – Sleep/Pain”; and (6) “Sour Diesial.”  (R., p.97.)   
                                            
1 Meyer also had a much smaller amount of cash in his wallet ($142.00).  (R., 
p.97.)     
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When interviewed by law enforcement, Meyer said he was “traveling from 
his home in Tri City to his father’s residence in Jerome,” where he was going to 
pick his father up, and “they were then going to drive together to California for a 
family reunion.”  (R., p.97.)  Meyer denied he intended to sell any of the 
marijuana, but instead claimed it was a “donation system,” and it was up to the 
recipient whether to pay anything for the marijuana.  (R., p.97.)  Meyer also 
stated some of the marijuana was for his personal use.  (R., p.97.)     
The state charged Meyer with possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver or, in the alternative, possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces.  
(R., pp.7-8, 43-44, 48-49.)  The state also filed an Information Part II alleging 
Meyer is a persistent violator based on three prior felony convictions, including 
convictions for violating Washington’s Uniformed Controlled Substance Act and 
for conspiracy to deliver marijuana.  (R., pp.81-82.) 
Prior to trial, Meyer filed a motion asking the court to provide the jury with 
a necessity defense instruction.  (R., pp.77-78.)  The state filed a written 
objection to Meyer’s request (R., pp.85-113), and the court denied Meyer’s 
motion after a hearing (R., p.115).  Meyer thereafter entered a conditional guilty 
plea to possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces, reserving the right to 
appeal the district court’s ruling denying his request for a necessity defense 
instruction.  (R., pp.116-125.)  The court imposed a unified three-year sentence 
with six months fixed.  (R., pp.178-181.)  Meyer filed a motion to reduce his 
sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.187, 195.)   




 Meyer states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Meyer’s request 
for a jury instruction on his necessity defense. 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:  
 
 To the extent State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563 (1990), 
stands for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to a necessity defense 
instruction whenever a defendant presents evidence that he possesses 
marijuana for medicinal purposes, should Hastings be overruled because a jury 
cannot make legal what the law explicitly prohibits, and because it is well-settled 
that a district court has discretion to decide whether the evidence supports a 





The Offer Of Proof Did Not Support Meyer’s Request For A Necessity 
Defense Instruction, And This Court Should Disavow Hastings To The Extent It 
Holds That Anytime A Defendant Presents Evidence That He Uses Marijuana 




 Meyer contends the district court erred in denying his pre-trial motion 
requesting a necessity defense instruction.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-16.)  The 
district court’s rejection of Meyer’s request for a necessity defense instruction 
was consistent with the legal principle that a defendant is not entitled to such an 
instruction when the instruction is unsupported by a prima facie case relevant to 
the instruction.  To the extent the Court’s opinion in State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 
854, 801 P.2d 563 (1990), holds otherwise, it should be overruled.       
  
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Jury instruction claims are questions of law over which the appellate court 
exercises free review.  State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691, 694 
(1992);  Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 265, 16 P.3d 937, 941 (Ct. App. 2000).  A 
defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction that is an erroneous statement of the 
law, is not supported by the evidence, is an impermissible comment on the 
evidence or is adequately covered by other instructions.  State v. Johns, 112 
Idaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987); State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 
632-33, 38 P.3d 1285, 1288-89 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 
665-66, 8 P.3d 657 (Ct. App. 2000).  Whether a reasonable view of the evidence 
supports an instruction is a matter within the trial court’s discretion.  State v. 
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Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249 (1997); State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 
878, 920 P.2d 391, 395 (1996).  
 
C. The Offer Of Proof Did Not Support Meyer’s Request For A Necessity 
Defense Instruction, And This Court Should Disavow Hastings To The 
Extent It Holds That Anytime A Defendant Presents Evidence That He 
Uses Marijuana For Medicinal Reasons, He Is Entitled To A Necessity 
Defense Instruction 
 
In Idaho, it is illegal to possess marijuana whether for personal use or with 
the intent to deliver.  I.C. § 37-2732(a), (e); see also ICJI 402A, 402B.  
Nevertheless, Meyer seeks to avoid Idaho’s legal prohibition on the possession 
and distribution of marijuana by claiming a necessity defense when the marijuana 
is allegedly used or distributed for medicinal purposes.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-
16.)  The district court correctly rejected Meyer’s request for a necessity defense 
instruction.  
 It is well-settled that a district court may properly refuse a requested 
instruction, which is not supported by the evidence.  State v. Beavers, 152 Idaho 
180, 183, 268 P.3d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2010).  To be entitled to an instruction on an 
affirmative defense, a defendant must “present facts sufficient to make out a 
prima facie case relevant to [the] defense.”  State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-
66, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 (Ct. App. 2000).  A prima facie case relevant to a 
necessity defense required Meyer to show a specific threat of immediate harm, 
which he did not bring about, that rendered it necessary for him to possess 
marijuana.  State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 879, 920 P.2d 391, 396 (1996);   
State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 855, 801 P.2d 563, 564 (1990); ICJI 1512.  
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Meyer failed to meet his burden of showing he was entitled to a necessity 
defense instruction.     
 The offer of proof provided to the district court in relation to Meyer’s 
request for a necessity defense instruction supports the conclusion that there 
was no evidence there was a specific threat of immediate harm that compelled 
Meyer to possess marijuana.  The pattern instruction for the necessity defense 
that Meyer requested reads: 
The defendant cannot be guilty [of (name of crime)] if the defendant 
acted because of necessity.  Conduct which violates the law is 
justified by necessity if: 
 
1. there is a specific threat of immediate harm to [the defendant] 
[name of person], 
 
2. the defendant did not bring about the circumstances which 
created the threat of immediate harm, 
 
3. the defendant could not have prevented the threatened harm by 
any less offensive alternative, and 
 
4. the harm caused by violating the law was less than the 
threatened harm. 
 
The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act because of necessity.  If you have a 
reasonable doubt on that issue, you must find the defendant not 
guilty. 
 
(R., pp.77-78 (quoting ICJI 1512).) 
 Meyer’s written offer of proof in support of a necessity defense instruction 
included a written opinion by Dr. Stephen McLennon concluding that “Meyer is 
warranted in his use of medicinal cannabis” and noting that Meyer’s “healthcare 
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providers in Washington” “sanctioned his use of it.”  (Sealed R.2, p.10.)  Dr. 
McLennon’s letter also espoused his personal views on medical marijuana.  (R., 
p.10.)  In addition to Dr. McLennon’s resume and opinion, Meyer submitted a 
“Health Care Professional Statement and Recommendation” from Presto Quality 
Care, a Washington company that apparently “recommends” whether a particular 
individual is qualified to use marijuana in that state, and a document signed by 
Tammy Lee Rose designating Meyer as her “Marijuana ‘Provider’” pursuant to 
Washington law.  (Sealed R., pp.11-12.)  At the hearing on Meyer’s motion, when 
asked what the “immediate harm” was that would warrant giving the instruction, 
defense counsel stated the “immediate harm would be the symptoms and fallout 
from being denied their medication.”  (2/6/2015 Tr.3, p.9, Ls.1-3, p.14, Ls.2-7.)     
    Based on the pre-trial offer of proof, the district court correctly rejected 
Meyer’s request for a necessity defense instruction.  That Meyer may be allowed 
to possess and even “provide” marijuana to another person in the State of 
Washington does not mean it was a necessity for him to transport his marijuana 
through the State of Idaho in order to avoid “immediate harm,” and his offer of 
proof fell far short of a prima facie case that would support a necessity defense 
instruction.  Indeed, Meyer’s offer of proof failed the first requirement – a specific 
                                            
2 Consistent with Meyer’s brief, the state will refer to the sealed documents 
Meyer submitted as his offer of proof as “Sealed R.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.1 n.1.)   
 
3 As noted by Meyer, the transcript of the hearing on his motion for a necessity 
defense instruction is included in the record rather than as a separately bound 
transcript; however, the state will cite the transcript as though it was separate, 
rather than in the record.   
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threat of immediate harm.  Meyer’s use of marijuana to treat chronic pain does 
not constitute a specific threat of immediate harm.   
“The necessity defense is based on the premise that ‘a person who is 
compelled to commit an illegal act in order to prevent a greater harm should not 
be punished for that act.’”  State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 34 P.3d 1096 (Ct. 
App. 2001) (quoting Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855, 801 P.2d at 564) (emphasis 
added).  In Hastings, the Court catalogued several circumstances in which 
defendants were allowed to raise a necessity defense, including:  (1) “in the 
context of prison escapes”; (2) in “defense to a charge of driving under the 
influence because [the defendant] had been assaulted and was driving herself to 
the hospital”; (3) in defense to a charge of disorderly conduct where the 
“defendants were engaged in a political protest”; (4) in defense to a speeding 
charge where the defendant “claimed that he sped up to pass other cars and get 
back in the right hand lane in order to allow a police officer in pursuit of another 
vehicle to get around him”; and (5) in defense to burglary, assault, and 
kidnapping charges “when a mother feared that her daughter was being sexually 
abused in her grandparents’ home.”  Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855-856, 801 P.2d 
at 564-565 (citations omitted).  Meyer’s claim that he was compelled to illegally 
possess marijuana in order to prevent the possibility that he and others may later 
“suffer” if they did not smoke it4 hardly compares to the circumstances previously 
found appropriate for a necessity defense instruction, and approval of such an 
                                            
4 Meyer also had less offensive alternatives to violating Idaho law, like not 
coming to Idaho, or coming to Idaho without his marijuana supply.  That Meyer 
wanted to come to Idaho to pick up his father does not mean he had to do so, or 
that he had to bring his marijuana with him when he did.     
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instruction in circumstances like Meyer’s makes a mockery of legitimate uses of 
the necessity defense.      
The state recognizes that the Court’s 1990 opinion in Hastings provides 
support for Meyer’s claim.  In Hastings, the defendant wanted to “present a 
defense of medical necessity” to her possession of marijuana charge “based on 
the fact that she suffers from rheumatoid arthritis and uses marijuana to control 
the pain and muscle spasms associated with the disease.”  Hastings, 118 Idaho 
at 855, 801 P.2d at 564.  The district court declined to “instruct the jury on 
medical necessity,” concluding it was not a “valid defense in Idaho.”  Id.  The 
district court, however, allowed Hastings to submit an offer of proof regarding 
what evidence she would present on the issue so the appellate court could “rule 
on whether or not the defendant would be allowed to present th[e] evidence to a 
jury.”  Id.  On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held Hastings was “entitled to 
present evidence at trial on the common law defense of necessity.  It was for the 
trier of fact to determine whether or not she has met the elements of that 
defense.”  Hastings, 118 Idaho at 856, 801 P.2d at 565.  To the extent this 
holding means a defendant who presents evidence that he uses marijuana for 
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medical reasons may violate Idaho’s marijuana laws, it should be overruled.5   
The rule of stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed 
“unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or 
unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles 
of law and remedy continued injustice.”  State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 
765, 768 (2002); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 
(1992) (“[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly 
wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise.”).  If Hastings holds that 
a defendant who uses marijuana for medical reasons is entitled to a necessity 
defense instruction in relation to a charge that includes possession of marijuana 
as an element, it is manifestly wrong for at least two reasons.  First, such a 
holding disregards the requirement that a defendant must present, and a court 
must find, “facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case relevant to [the] 
defense,” Camp, supra, because it would essentially allow the defense as a 
matter of law in “medical marijuana” situations.  Second, such a holding 
effectively creates a medical exception to Idaho’s marijuana laws.  It is neither a 
court’s, nor a jury’s, province to create a general exception to an unlawful act.  
                                            
5 The Court of Appeals has distinguished Hastings on its facts.  In Tadlock, 136 
Idaho at 415, 34 P.3d at 1098, the Court of Appeals held that Hastings applied 
only to a possession charge, but did not apply to possession of marijuana with 
intent to deliver.  Almost ten years later, in Beavers, 152 Idaho at 183-185, 268 
P.3d at 4-6, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the “necessity defense 
applies to the crime of trafficking,” and ultimately concluded the defendant failed 
to meet his burden of showing the evidence supported the instruction.  If 
necessary, this case is also distinguishable on the facts because, unlike the 
defendants in Hastings, Tadlock, and Beaver, Meyer did not live in Idaho and, 
therefore, was not compelled to be in this state and violate the law when the less 
offensive alternative of not coming here at all, or not coming here with his 
marijuana supply, was available to him.   
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See Sims v. ACI Northwest, Inc., 157 Idaho 906, 342 P.3d 618 (2005) (“The 
wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute are questions for the 
legislature alone.  If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the 
power to correct it is legislative, not judicial.”) (quotations and citations omitted); 
see also State v. Thayer, 14 A.3d 231, 235 (Vt. 2010) (“The necessity defense is 
generally not available to excuse criminal activity by those who disagree with the 
policies of the government.”) (quotations and citations omitted). To hold 
otherwise is inconsistent with the elements of a necessity defense and is contrary 
to our governmental structure.  “An emergency necessity to commit an act 
otherwise deemed a crime does not turn upon the rationality of the legislative 
choice.”  Thayer, 14 A.3d at 235.  The United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001), is 
instructive on this point.   
In Oakland Cannabis, the Court addressed “whether there is a medical 
necessity to the[] prohibitions” in the federal Controlled Substances Act and held 
“there is not.”  532 U.S. at 486.  The facts giving rise to the issue were based on 
California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996, which “creates an exception to 
California laws prohibiting the possession and cultivation of marijuana” where “a 
patient or his primary caregiver . . . possesses or cultivates marijuana for the 
patient’s medical purposes . . . upon the recommendation or approval of a 
physician.”  Id.  In response to the Compassionate Use Act, “several groups 
organized ‘medical cannabis dispensaries’” – Oakland Cannabis was one of 
those groups.  Id.  The United States sued Oakland Cannabis, arguing that 
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“whether or not [Oakland Cannabis’] activities are legal under California law,” 
they violated federal law, and a federal district court issued a preliminary 
injunction as part of that lawsuit.  Id. at 486-487.  Rather than appeal the 
injunction, Oakland Cannabis “openly violated it by distributing marijuana to 
numerous persons,” which resulted in contempt proceedings.  Id. at 487.  “In 
defense, [Oakland Cannabis] contended that any distributions were medically 
necessary,” claiming “[m]arijuana is the only drug . . . that can alleviate the 
severe pain and other debilitating symptoms of [Oakland Cannabis’] patients.”  
Id. at 487.  The district court rejected the defense.  Id.   
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, Oakland Cannabis argued that, 
“notwithstanding the apparently absolute language of [the Controlled Substances 
Act], the statute is subject to additional, implied exceptions, one of which is 
medical necessity.  According to [Oakland Cannabis], because necessity was a 
defense at common law, medical necessity should be read into the Controlled 
Substances Act.”  Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 490.  The Court “disagree[d].”  
Id.   
The Court first “note[d] it is an open question whether federal courts ever 
have authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by statute” since, 
“under our constitutional system, in which federal crimes are defined by statute 
rather than by common law,” “[w]hether, as a policy matter, an exemption should 
be created is a question for legislative judgment, not judicial inference.”  Id. 
(quotations and citations omitted).  “Nevertheless,” because the “Court has 
discussed the possibility of a necessity defense without altogether rejecting it,” 
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the Court addressed the application of the defense vis-à-vis the Controlled 
Substances Act, stating: 
We need not decide, however, whether necessity can ever 
be a defense when the federal statute does not expressly provide 
for it.  In this case, to resolve the question presented, we need only 
recognize that a medical necessity exception for marijuana is at 
odds with the terms of the Controlled Substances Act.  The statute, 
to be sure, does not explicitly abrogate the defense.  But its 
provisions leave no doubt that the defense is unavailable. 
   
Under any conception of legal necessity, one principle is 
clear:  The defense cannot succeed when the legislature itself has 
made a determination of values.  In the case of the Controlled 
Substances Act, the statute reflects a determination that marijuana 
has no medical benefits worthy of exception (outside the confines 
of a Government-approved research project).  Whereas some other 
drugs can be dispensed and prescribed for medical use, the same 
is not true for marijuana.  Indeed, for purposes of the Controlled 
Substances Act, marijuana has no currently accepted medical use 
at all. 
 
Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 491 (quotations and citations omitted).   
The Court further noted the “structure” of the Controlled Substances Act 
supported its conclusion because it “imposes restrictions on the manufacture and 
distribution of the substance according to the schedule in which it has been 
placed.”  Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 491-492.  Under the Controlled 
Substances Act, marijuana is a Schedule I drug, which means it “has no currently 
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, has a high potential for 
abuse, and has a lack of accepted safety for use under medical supervision.”  Id. 
at 492 (quotations and citations omitted, ellipses omitted).6  “For these reasons,” 
                                            
6 Marijuana is also classified as a Schedule I drug under Idaho law based on the 




the Court held “medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and 
distributing marijuana.”  Id. at 494. 
This Court should similarly hold that medical necessity is not a defense to 
Idaho’s laws prohibiting the possession or delivery of marijuana.  If the Idaho 
legislature wished to create an exception for medicinal marijuana use, it could 
follow the lead of several surrounding states and do so.  Oakland Cannabis, 532 
U.S. at 502 n.4 (noting that, “[s]ince 1996 . . . Alaska, Colorado, Maine, Nevada, 
Oregon, and Washington have passed medical marijuana initiatives”).  Absent 
such legislative action, judicial endorsement of a defense that would create such 
an exception should be rejected and, to the extent Hastings stands for such a 
proposition, the Court should overrule it.         
 Because Meyer failed to meet his burden of presenting evidence of a 
prima facie case supporting an instruction on the necessity defense, and 
because the Court cannot and should not authorize a medical marijuana 
exception to Idaho’s marijuana laws, Meyer is not entitled to relief and his 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Meyer’s conviction.  
 DATED this 1st day of March, 2016. 
 
       _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello  _ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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